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Allocation of sender risks in wire transfers-
the Common law and UCC Article 4A*
BENJAMIN GEVA**
I The wire transfer'
In a credit transfer the payor's instructions are communicated to the payor's
bank directly by the payor, without the intermediation of a credit to the payee's
account at the payee's bank. When the instructions are thus communicated, the
payor's account is debited. As such, in a credit transfer, unlike in a debit
transfer (or in the cheque collection process), the first impact of the payor's
instructions on the banking system is a debit to the payor's account with the
payor's bank. Having received the payor's instructions and debited the payor's
account, the payor's bank forwards the instructions to the payee's bank which
then proceeds to credit the payee's account. Thus, in a credit transfer, the debit
to the payor's account precedes the credit to the payee's account, and is not
subject to reversal, eg for lack of funds. In a credit transfer, funds debited to
the payor's account are "pushed" to that of the payee.
In a credit transfer, the payor is called the originator and the payee is the
beneficiary. Accordingly, the payor's bank is the originator's bank and the
payee's bank is the beneficiary's bank. Any other bank participating in the
transaction is an intermediary bank. Payment instructions are the subject
matter of a "payment order". Each payment order is transmitted by a sender to
a receiving bank.
A credit transfer is initiated by the issue of a payment order by the originator
to the originator's bank. The transaction is ultimately carried out by debiting
the originator's account at the originator's bank and crediting the beneficiary's
account at the beneficiary's bank. Where these are separate banks, the
originator's bank executes the originator's payment order by issuing its own
payment order, either to the beneficiary's bank or to an intermediary's bank.
An intermediary bank will issue its own payment order either to the
beneficiary's bank or to another intermediary bank, that will do the same,
until a final payment order is issued to the beneficiary's bank. Each interbank
payment order must be paid by the sender to the receiving bank. Interbank
communication thus corresponds to the interbank payment or settlement
facilities; namely, each bank will issue a payment order only to a receiving bank
with which such settlement facilities are available. Typically, such facilities are
either bilateral, in the form of a correspondent account, that is, an account one
bank has with the other, or multilateral, in the form of accounts several banks
hold with a central counterpart, which could be the central bank.
* This paper draws heavily (particularly so far as UCC Article 4A is concerned) on my book, The
Law of Electronic Funds Transfer (1992-95).
** Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University (Toronto) Canada.
See Geva "International funds transfers: mechanisms and laws" in Norton, Reed and Walden




Accordingly, a credit transfer may be either in-house or out-house. The latter
are either correspondent or complex. Where the originator's and the
beneficary's accounts are in the same bank the transaction is in-house. No
interbank payment order is required to execute the originator's payment order.
Where the originator's and the beneficiary's accounts are in different banks,
which are correspondents, meaning one of them has an account with the other,
the transaction is a correspondent transfer, which requires an interbank
payment order between the two correspondent banks. Payment of the payment
order is then carried out at this account.
Otherwise, the transaction requires the participation of intermediary banks
and is classified as a complex transfer. In its simplest pattern, a common
correspondent, that is, a third bank having bilateral correspondent relation-
ships with the originator's and beneficiary's banks, will intermediate between
them. One or more intermediary banks may be required in the absence of such
a common correspondent. In its most sophisticated pattern, a complex transfer
will involve a clearing-house facilitating multilateral interbank communication
and settlement on the books of a central counterpart, with whom they all hold
accounts, such as a central bank. For each country or currency, the domestic
Large Value Transfer System ("LVTS") linking all major banks is such a
facility.
In a credit transfer, each payment order, whether from the originator to the
originator's bank or from one bank to another, can be given in writing, orally
or by electronic means. A payment order is given electronically whenever it is
embodied in a cable or a telex ("wire"), initiated through a magnetic tape or
diskette that may physically be delivered, or sent from a terminal over a
dedicated communication network. Communication by wire or over a
dedicated network is "on-line"; when transmission immediately follows input
it is also in "real-time". An electronic funds transfer ("EFT") occurs whenever
a payment order is given by any electronic means.
The segment of the domestic payment system for the exchange and
settlement of large value credit transfers is referred to as Large Value
Transfer System ("LVTS"). In major currency countries local LVTS utilize
communication networks for the transmission of interbank payment orders. In
the past, overseas/cross border interbank communication was either by air
letter or by means of cable or telex ("wire"); the large value credit transfer has
thus been called in fact, to this day, a "wire transfer". However, in overseas/
cross border interbank communication the wire has increasingly lost ground to
the dedicated communication network of SWIFT.
Today, all major currency countries have computerized (or automated)
facilities for the exchange of messages. As well, they either have adopted or are
moving towards the adoption of special settlement arrangements for large
value credit transfers.
A technologically advanced LVTS (or "wire transfers system") is
characterized by a communication system linking participating banks by
means of dedicated lines capable of providing on-line communication in real-
time. According to Stone, 2 "[t]he virtually instantaneous transfer of payment
data by a two-way telephone-line communication network shapes the
prominent economic operations characteristics" of a LVTS. These character-
2 Stone "Electronic payment basics" 1986 Ec Rev Fed Res Bank of Atlanta 3 9-10.
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istics are "speed, single transaction focus and . . . security", facilitating a
relatively expensive individualized handling, confirmation and notification for
each payment.
LVTS settlement usually takes place on the books of a central counterpart
where all direct participants held accounts. Typically, and in all major currency
countries, this central counterpart is the central bank.
As a rule, settlement is conducted either on a net-net (multilateral net) or
gross basis. In the former, settlement occurs only periodically, usually daily, at
the end of each clearing cycle, for the payment orders exchanged during the
clearing period. In the latter, settlement for each payment occurs on a real-time
basis, as each individual order is communicated and processed.
This means that in a net net settlement system, payment orders are
exchanged among participating banks during a clearing cycle, usually one day.
At the end of the cycle, multilateral (often preceded by bilateral) netting takes
place, sometime at the conclusion of an accounting process which has taken
place throughout the entire daily exchange. Balances are then adjusted on the
books of the central bank, usually shortly after the end of the day operations,
by means of credit transfers from net net debtor banks to net net creditor
banks. Conversely, in a gross settlement system, each transfer is settled
individually on the books of the central bank as it is communicated to the
receiving bank.
II Legal fundamentals
(i) The common law
(a) Characterization and chain of liability
It is universally accepted under the common law that "there is no express or
implied trust in favour of the [beneficiary] resulting from the [originator's]
bank accepting instructions to make a credit transfer".3 Assuming the
originator's payment order to be like a cheque, a mandate, and taking into
account the express statutory rejection of the assignment theory as to bills of
exchange and cheques,4 Pennington, Hudson and Mann maintain that "it
seems likely that by analogy the acceptance of the [payment order] by the
[originator's] bank similarly does not constitute an assignment of funds".
Nonetheless, they further acknowledge that "since the Bills of Exchange Act
... only applies to bills and cheques, the argument is by no means conclusive
and a deeper analysis is desirable".
5
English law distinguishes between legal and equitable assignment. The
former must be absolute, in writing, and perfected by the assignee's notice to
the debtor.6 In a credit transfer, whether the assignee is the beneficiary or his
bank, no such notice is usually given to the debtor (namely the originator's
3 Pennington, Hudson and Mann Commercial Banking Law (1978) 285.
4 See s 53(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (UK), corresponding eg to s 126 of the Canadian
Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1985, C B-4 and s 51 of South African Bills of Exchange Act 34 of
1964.
5 (n 3) 285.
6 See eg ibid. The standard provision is s 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (UK), on which
similar provisions are modelled throughout the Commonwealth. See eg s 53(1) of the Ontario
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act RSO 1990, c 34.
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bank). This excludes the possibility that the originator's payment order
initiates legal assignment. At the same time, an equitable assignment may be
made more informally. However, "even so, not every mandate or authorization
to pay money amounts to an equitable assignment".
7
Support to the application of the assignment theory comes from the
American case of Delbrueck v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 8 It was stated
in this case9 that the originator's payment order to the originator's bank,
ultimately followed by a payment order ("notice") given to the beneficiary's
bank, constitutes an assignment of the funds either to the beneficiary's bank or
to the beneficiary. While no assignment occurs in the absence of some form of
communication to the assignee, such communication need not necessarily
emanate from the assignor (originator) and is sufficient where it is given to the
assignee's agent. The court thus bypassed the question as to whether the
assignee is the beneficiary himself or his bank, the latter being treated either as
the assignee or his agent.
Conversely, in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Banker's Trust Co,'0 Staughton J
purported to reject this view altogether. Accordingly, he stated that "[a]n
[interbank] account transfer means the process by which some other ...
institution comes to owe money to the [beneficiary] . . ., and the obligation [of
the originator's bank to the originator] is extinguished or reduced pro tanto".
Specifically rejecting "dicta in one American case", apparently referring to
Delbrueck, he went on to note that in this context, "[t]ransfer may be a
somewhat misleading word, since the original obligation is not assigned... ; a
new obligation by a new debtor is created". 1'
Staughton J's view seems to be in line with the ultimate conclusion of
Pennington, Hudson and Mann. Having thoroughly reviewed pertinent case
law, they stated that "[i]t is. . . generally accepted that a mere mandate to pay
does not constitute an equitable assignment of funds, whether the payee is
notified of the mandate or not".' 2
Neither creating a trust nor initiating an assignment of funds, but rather,
being a mere mandate to pay, the originator's payment order generates "a
string of operations carried out by the different banks acting in a representative
capacity". 1 That is, the legal position of each participant is primarily
determined under agency law. The leading case to that effect is Royal Products
Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd.
14
In the course of his judgment, Webster J specifically declined to treat the
originator's instructions in an out-house transfer as "any separate or distinct
contract of any kind". Rather, he regarded such instructions as "simply an
authority and instruction, from a customer to its bank, to transfer an amount
standing to the credit of the customer with that bank to the credit of [the
beneficiary] with another bank". As such, the originator's instructions give rise
7 (n 3) 286.
8 609 F 2d 1047 (2nd Cir 1979).
9 ibid 1051, alternative holding.
10 1988 1 LI Rep 259 (QB).
11 ibid 273.
12 (n3) 589.
13 Ellinger Modern Banking Law (1987) 367-368.
14 1981 2 LI Rep 194 (QB)
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to "an ordinary banking operation", namely "of a kind which is often carried
out internally".' 
5
Stated otherwise, the payment order is a mandate. In carrying it out, the
originator's bank acts as the originator's agent. As such, the originator's bank
owes the originator "a duty to use reasonable care and skill". It is not
absolutely responsible for completing the credit transfer. Rather, in case of
noncompletion, delayed completion or miscompletion, the originator's bank is
liable to the originator for damages arising from the breach of the above-
mentioned duty.
As the originator's agent, the originator's bank "would be vicariously liable
for the breach of that duty by any servant or agent to whom [it] delegated the
carrying out the instructions".' 6 Accordingly, the originator's bank is liable to
the originator for the intermediary bank's negligence. In that respect, there is
no difference in the responsibility of the originator's bank for the negligence of
a branch (that is, of the servants or employees of the originator's bank) on one
hand, and for the negligence of a correspondent bank (namely, of its agent).
Webster J specifically rejected the application of the strict compliance
doctrine, emanating from the law of letters of credit, to the standard of
compliance required from the originator's bank as agent. Rather, the required
standard is that of a duty of care. This means that in complying with the
originator's instructions the originator's bank "[is] required [possibly through
the use of a correspondent bank, its agent] to make funds available to [the
beneficiary's bank] in one way or another .. . and to notify [the beneficiary's
bank] that the sum [is] to be credited to the account of [the beneficiary]".'
7
That is, the originator's instructions must be carried out "with reasonable care
and skill".' 8 It is however submitted that "strict compliance" ought to be
regarded as the required standard for the duty of the originator's bank to issue
onwards a corresponding payment order matching that of the originator.' 9
In the United States, prior to Article 4A, Walker v Texas Commerce Bank2 °
stated that in receiving a payment order from a sender, a receiving bank is
under a duty "to implement commercially reasonable internal procedures
designed to process [a payment order] in accordance with [the sender's]
instructions, to verify the accuracy of, and compliance with, instructions, to
detect and minimize inaccuracy, and to act diligently to remedy errors". 2' This
is quite in line with the receiving bank's "duty to use reasonable care and skill"
in carrying out a payment order set out in Royal Products.22 More specifically,
Walker provides a rationale underlying cases allocating the risk of erroneous
execution of payment orders to the erring bank. This applies to the erroneous
issue of a duplicate payment order,23 a payment order containing a higher
amount than instructed,24 or a payment order designating an unintended
15 ibid 198.
16 (n 14) 198.
17 ibid 199, emphasis added.
18 ibid.
19 See Clansmen Resources Ltd v TD Bank (19 Dec 1988), 86/00047 (BCSC), affirmed on other
grounds (1990), 43 BCLR (2d) 273 (CA).
20 635 F Supp 678 (SD Tex 1986).
21 ibid 682.
22 (n 14) 198.
23 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co v Outerbridge (1990) 72 OR (2d) 161 (HCJ).
24 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group v Westpac Banking Group (1978)78 ALR 157 (Aust HC).
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beneficiary.2 5 In such cases, the erring bank is left with an action in restitution
against the overpaid or wrongly paid beneficiary or its bank.
Furthermore, Walker, as a derivative of Royal Products, appears to underly
also Royal Bank of Canada v Stangl. 26 In the latter case, a beneficiary's bank
was held liable to its sender (an intermediary bank) in negligence for the failure
to clarify the contents of a payment order instructing payment to an account
that did not belong to the named beneficiary.
27
On its part, the intermediary bank owes "no duty of any kind direct to [the
originator]". While the originator's bank is entitled to carry out the
originator's instructions by using the services of a correspondent bank, the
originator typically gives the originator's bank "no authority which would
have ... the effect of creating privity of contract between the [originator] and
[the intermediary bank]". 28 Stated, otherwise, in the absence of privity of
contract between the originator as principal and the intermediary bank as
subagent, the latter owes no duty to the former and thus is not liable to it for
damages generated by its negligence. 29 Rather, acting as an agent for the
originator's bank, the intermediary bank's duty of care is owed to its principal,
the originator's bank. In turn, as already indicated, the originator's bank is
vicariously liable to the originator for damages arising from the intermediary
bank's negligent acts or omissions.
Prior to Article 4A, American common law, contrary to the common law of
England, allowed the originator to recover directly from a defaulting
intermediary 30 or beneficiary's bank. 31 Recovery was allowed on the basis of
agency, negligence, or a third party beneficiary theory.
(b) Revocability
In principle, as the originator's agent, the originator's bank must comply with
the originator's countermand of payment, which effectively terminates the
mandate created by the (now countermanded) payment order. In an in-house
credit transfer, the revocation instruction must reach the bank before it acted
on the payment order, that is, prior to the payment into the beneficiary's
account.32 Otherwise, in an out-house transfer, the originator's revocation
right comes to an end when the beneficiary's bank has received the payment
order instructing payment to the beneficiary together with cover. 33 Neither
payment nor advice to the beneficiary is required. Arguably, however, the
revocation right comes to an end also where the beneficiary's bank binds itself
to the beneficiary before receipt of cover.
25 Clansmen Resources Ltd v Toronto Dominion Bank (1990) 43 BCLR (2d) 273 (CA).
26 (1992) 32 ACWS (3d) 17 (Ont Ct Gen Div) [092/066/089-19].
27 For a critical case comment, see Geva "Ambiguous wire instructions: Royal Bank of Canada v
Stangl" 1994-95 Can Bus LJ 435.
28 (n 14) 198.
29 However, this view may not be universally shared. Thus Powell The Law of Agency (1961) 309
concludes that "[i]n the present state of authorities it cannot be said with certainty that the sub-
agent would never be liable to [the principal] for negligence". It is possible that liability in
negligence will be fastened "where the sub-agent [is] a person who professe[s] a particular skill".
30 See eg Evra v Swiss Bank 522 F Supp 820 (ND I11 981), reversed on other grounds, 673 F 2d 951
(7th Cir 1982).
31 See eg Securities Fund Ser Inc v Am Nat'7 bank & Trust Co 542 F Supp 323 (ND I11 1982).
32 Gibson v Minet (1824) 2 Bing 7 130 ER 206.
33 See Royal Products case (n 14) 198-199.
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Presumably, in an out-house transfer, where the originator has no privity
with any receiving bank other than his own, revocation instructions must be
communicated by the originator to his bank. The originator's bank must then
transmit the revocation instructions onward through the chain of participating
banks, all the way up to the beneficiary's bank where they must reach prior to
the above-mentioned cutoff point.
In connection with interbank payment orders transmitted over a funds
transfer system, irrevocability may be forwarded by participating banks to the
point of the release of the payment order b'the sending bank. This may be
established by a funds transfer system rule. 4 In the absence of such a rule,
irrevocability upon release may be inferred on the basis of the nature of the
system and pertinent banking practices. 3 5 Obviously, irrevocability uponrelease is tantamount to no revocability.
(c) Discharge
Payment between the originator and the beneficiary is completed so as to
discharge the former's debt to the latter where the beneficiary obtains, vis-a-vis
the beneficiary's bank, "the unconditional right to the immediate use of funds
transferred". 3 6 In this context, "unconditional" was broadly construed by the
House of Lords to mean "unfettered and unrestricted" and not merely "neither
subject to the fulfilment of a condition precedent nor defeasible on failure to
fulfil a condition subsequent". 37 Prior to crediting the beneficiary's account
with the amount of the payment order, 38 a beneficiary's bank may become
unconditionally liable to the beneficiary upon receiving cover for the payment
order, deciding to credit the beneficiary's account, or upon credit risk
assumption, actual or presumed, on the basis of either availability of cover or
explicit assumption of risk in anticipation for its impeding arrival.39
(ii) UCC Article 4A
(a) Introduction
In the United States, pre-Article 4A law governing credit transfers was
described as "a poorly developed framework of legal rules". 40 In the prefatory
note, the drafters explained the need for Article 4A on the basis of the absence
of a "comprehensive body of law that defines the rights and obligations that
arise from wire transfers". Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code was
designed to meet this inadequacy and "provide a comprehensive body of law
that we do not have today". It is now in force in most, including all major,
34 In the UK this is so provided under the CHAPS Rules. According to Rule 2, a CHAPS payment
order must command "an irrevocably guaranteed unconditional sterling payment for same day
settlement" (emphasis added).
35 See eg Delbrueck case above (n 8) 1051 (with respect to CHIPS before CHIPS Rules were revised
to state irrevocability expressly in current Rule 2).
36 The Brimnes, Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v The Brimnes (Owners) 1973 1 All ER 769 782, per
Brandor J (QBD), affirmed 1974 3 All ER 88 (CA).
37 A/S Awilco v Fulivia SpA Di Navigazione, (The "Chikuma') 1981 LI Rep 371, 375, per Lord
Bridge (HL).
38 That is, crediting the collected funds balance of the beneficiary.
39 For detailed analysis of case law, see Geva "Payment into a bank account" 1990 JIBL 108.40 Scott "Corporate wire transfers and the uniform new payment code" 1983 Colum L Rev 1664.
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American jurisdictions. It was specifically adopted by the two LVTS' in the
United States, Fedwire and CHIPS, as the law governing a credit transfer that
passes through each of these networks. UCC Article 4A strongly influenced the
Model Law on International Credit Transfers, prepared by UNCITRAL for
consideration for adoption by United Nations member states as national
legislation.
41
The transaction covered by Article 4A is a nonconsumer credit transfer,
called a "funds transfer".42 The typical transaction is high speed (usually
sameday) large value credit transfer between sophisticated business or financial
organizations. Another characteristic is low cost in relation to the value of the
payment. 43 Finally, high speed automated processing is usually assumed. 44
A "funds transfer" governed by UCC Article 4A consists of a series of
transactions, beginning with the originator's payment order, made for the
purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the order. 45 A "payment
order" means an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally,
in writing, or electronically (whether online or offline), to pay, or cause another
bank to pay a fixed or determined amount of money to a beneficiary.
46
Accordingly, for each payment order, the parties are the sender and the
receiving bank. In connection with a complex account transfer, the parties to a
funds transfer are the originator, the originator's bank, one or more
intermediary banks, the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary.
An interbank payment order may be transmitted over a "funds-transfer
system", that is, a communication network of a clearing house or another
association of banks.47 The domestic LVTS for each country, such as CHIPS
and Fedwire in the United States, as well as the international SWIFT network,
is such a "funds-transfer system". To some extent, a rule adopted by a funds-
transfer system ("funds-transfer system rule"), and to a lesser extent, even a
bilateral agreement, may supersede the provisions of Article 4A.48
Unless displaced by a bilateral agreement or a funds-transfer system rule, the
law applicable to each payment order is that of the jurisdiction in which the
receiving bank is located. Similarly, the law of the jurisdiction in which the
beneficiary's bank is located governs the relationship between the beneficiary's
bank and the beneficiary, as well as the discharge of the originator's debt to the
beneficiary. A funds-transfer system rule, displacing any of the above, binds all
participants to a funds transfer having notice that the funds-transfer system
might be used in the funds transfer and of the choice of law made by the
system. As indicated, both CHIPS and Fedwire effectively selected Article 4A
41 See Resolution 47/34 adopted by the UN General Assembly on Nov 25, 1992, encouraging UN
member states to consider enacting the Model Law as national legislation. The full text of the
Model Law is annexed to the Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, 25th Sess UN Doc A/47/17. For the recognizable influence of UCC Article 4A on the
Model Law, see Crawford "International credit transfers: the influence of Article 4A on the
Model Law" 1991 Can Bus LJ 166.
42 UCC § 4A-104 and 108. The Model Law calls the transaction (Article 2(a)) "credit transfer".
43 See Prefatory Note to Article 4A.
44 See eg UCC § 4A-207(b)(1) and Official Comment 2.
41 UCC § 4A-104(a). Pertinent terms are defined in §§ 4A 103 to 105.
46 UCC § 4A-103(a)(1).
47 UCC § 4A-105(a)(5).
4 UCC § 4A-501. Federal Reserve regulation and operating circular supersede inconsistent
provisions of Article 4A under UCC 4A-107.
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as the governing law. However, in principle and unless displaced by a funds
transfer system rule the applicable law is determined under Article 4A by
reference to each individual bilateral relationship (that is, sender-receiving
bank, beneficiary's bank-beneficiary, and originator-beneficiary) and not the
entire funds transfer as a whole.49
(b) The payment order
A payment order is a request by the sender to the receiving bank which can be
accepted or rejected. It does not create agency or mandate. Nor is it
tantamount to the assignment of funds; rather, acceptance by a receiving bank
of a sender's payment order generates a contract sui generis that does not fall
into any established relationship. A receiving bank is neither an agent (of the
sender, beneficiary or of any other participant) nor an assignee (of the
originator's funds at the originator's bank). Acceptance inures solely to the
benefit of an immediate party in privity. Thus, acceptance by a receiving bank
other than the beneficiary's bank inures to the benefit of the sender; acceptance
by the beneficiary's bank inures to the benefit of the beneficiary.5 °
Acceptance of a payment order by the beneficiary's bank is either by paying
(or advising) the beneficiary, or where the beneficiary has an account at the
beneficiary's bank, also by obtaining cover for such a payment. 51 Acceptance
by a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank is by the execution of the
payment order, that is, by the issue of a corresponding payment order,
intended to carry out the one received by the bank. 2 The executing bank must
issue a payment order that strictly conforms to that received by it with respect
to the amount, the ultimate destination of the funds, and the identity of any
specifically designated intermediary bank. Otherwise, the executing bank's
duties as to speed, the means of communication, the use of a funds-transfer
system, and the selection of an intermediary bank where none is designated by
the sender, are to be carried out with reasonable care and skill.53 Nothing short
of "execution" serves as acceptance by a receiving bank other than that of the
beneficiary. Stated otherwise, giving notice of acceptance, obtaining cover for
the payment order or incurring an obligation to accept, will not serve as
acceptance by a nonbeneficiary's bank.5" An effective obligation to accept
must be solely by express agreement but by itself is not acceptance.5 5
49 Choice of law is governed by UCC § 4A-507. In the Model Law, the conflict of laws provision is
optional. It does not deal with the effect of a funds-transfer system rule.50 See in general UCC § 4A-212 (and Official Comment) as well as 4A-209 Official Comment I.
51 Under Article 9(1) of the Model Law, acceptance by the beneficiary's bank is constituted also (i)
upon receipt of the payment order (but only if so agreed with the sender) or (ii) by giving notice
to the sender.
52 UCC § 4A-209 and 301.
53 UCC § 4A-302.
-4 In this respect, the Model Law is different. Under Article 7, acceptance by a receiving bank other
than the beneficiary's bank may occur not only by execution, but also (i) upon receipt of the
payment order by the receiving bank (but only if so agreed), (ii) by giving notice of acceptance to
the sender, (iii) by debiting the sender's account or (iv) automatically after the expiry of the
rejection period (usually on the second banking day following the receipt of the payment order)
provided no notice of rejection had been given (but only where sender's funds are available and
sender information in the payment order is adequate).
55 UCC § 4A-212.
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An unaccepted payment order expires after five days,56 but may anyway be
rejected even earlier, at the receiving bank's discretion. Notice of rejection is
required to avoid liability for interest. In one case, notice of rejection precludes
acceptance by a beneficiary's bank holding adequate funds as cover.
57
Otherwise, there is no acceptance by inaction or mere passage of time.
Suspension of payment by a receiving bank is tantamount to rejection by
operation of law. In general, the occurrence of either acceptance or rejection is
irreversible. 58 No duty is fastened on a bank that has neither accepted nor
rejected a payment order.
59
Acceptance of a payment order by a receiving bank obliges the sender to pay
the amount of the order.6 ° Sender's payment is carried out usually by means
of
(i) an interbank final settlement over a funds-transfer system;
(ii) a credit by the sending bank to the receiving bank's account, in which
case payment occurs at midnight of the day on which the credit is
withdrawable and the receiving bank learns of this fact, unless credit was
withdrawn earlier, in which case payment occurred at the time of
withdrawal; 62 or
(iii) a debit by the receiving bank to the sender's account, provided funds are
actually available in the account.
Where the receiving bank is that of the beneficiary, payment by means of a
debit to the sender's account containing adequate cover, in fact, even by means
of the availability of cover for a debit in such an account, will constitute
acceptance only at the opening of the next funds-transfer system day, provided
the payment order was not rejected until one hour thereafter.
63
A payment order is cancelled by operation of law if it remains unaccepted
for five days, as well as where the receiving bank knows of the sender's death or
legal incapacity before acceptance. Otherwise, a payment order can be
cancelled or amended by means of a communication of the sender to his
receiving bank. Cancellation or amendment can be made by the sender
unilaterally up to the time of acceptance by the receiving bank. After
56 UCC § 4A-21 l(d).
57 See text at n 63 below.
58 Rejection of payment order is governed by UCC § 4A-211.
59 Conversely, the Model Law imposes on a receiving bank that has not rejected a payment order,
assistance, inquiry and notice obligation, even in the absence of acceptance on its part. See eg
Articles 8, 10 and 13.
60 UCC § 4A-402.
61 Payment by sender to receiving bank is governed by UCC § 4A-403. For the beneficiary's bank,
sender's payment may constitute acceptance, at times governed by § 4A-209(b). See text at n 63
below.
62 Conversely, under Article 6(b) of the Model Law, sending bank's payment of payment order by
crediting the receiving bank's account occurs when this credit is used or, if not used, on the
banking day following the day on which the credit is available for use to the knowledge of the
receiving bank (rather than at midnight of the day on which the credit is withdrawable as under
Article 4A).
63 UCC § 4A-209(b)(3). Conversely, under Article 9(l)(c) of the Model Law, acceptance of the
beneficiary's bank by means of debiting the sender's account occurs when the beneficiary's bank
actually debits the account. Under Article 9(l)(h), automatic acceptance by the mere availability
of sender's funds (without actually debiting the sender's account) takes place on the second
banking day following the receipt of the payment order (containing sufficient information to
identify the sender) unless notice of rejection was given prior to that.
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acceptance, and in the absence of an agreement or a funds-transfer system rule
to the contrary, cancellation or amendment requires the agreement of the
receiving bank. Where a receiving bank other than that of the beneficiary
agrees to the cancellation or amendment, a conforming cancellation or
amendment must be issued by it to its own receiving bank.64 The funds transfer
is thus effectively aborted if the last receiving bank to receive a payment order
is advised by its sender of the cancellation or amendment prior to the
acceptance of the payment order by that receiving bank.
Where the receiving bank is the beneficiary's bank, post-acceptance
cancellation or amendment can be made only with respect to an unauthorized
or mistaken funds transfer. As with respect to any post-acceptance cancellation
or amendment, agreement of the receiving bank, in this case the beneficiary's
bank, is required.
Unless otherwise provided by an agreement or funds-transfer system rule,
the sender is liable to a receiving bank for any loss incurred by that bank in a
post-acceptance cancellation (or amendment) or attempted cancellation (or
amendment).65
Injunction and creditor process by the originator's creditors can prevent the
originator's bank from initiating a funds transfer. Likewise, an injunction and
creditor process by the beneficiary's process can prevent the beneficiary from
receiving the benefit of payment once the funds transfer has been completed. A
funds transfer cannot however, be intercepted by third parties between
acceptance by the originator's bank and by the beneficiary's bank.66
(c) Completion, discharge and revocation
A funds transfer is completed "by acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a
payment order for the benefit of the originator's payment order".67 Acceptance
by the beneficiary's bank further constitutes payment by the originator to the
beneficiary, namely a discharge of the originator's obligation on the underlying
transaction, that is, of the debt paid by means of the funds transfer. 68 Finally,
as indicated, acceptance by the beneficiary's bank is by making payment to the
beneficiary or by advising the beneficiary of the receipt of the payment order
(or that the account of the beneficiary has been credited with respect to the
order). For a beneficiary holding an account at a beneficiary's bank, which is
obviously the usual case, acceptance by the beneficiary's bank is also by
receiving payment from its sender. 69 Acceptance (in fact, otherwise than by
payment to the beneficiary) generates an obligation by the beneficiary's bank
to pay the beneficiary.
70
64 UCC § 4A-211.
65 ibid.
66 § 4A-502 and 503.
67 § 4A-104(a).
68 § 4A-406.
69 § 4A-209(b) and (c). For the Model Law variation see n 51 above.
70 § 4A-404. No corresponding rule is provided for in the Model Law. UCC 4A-404 further
requires the beneficiary's bank (at the risk of incurring liability for interest and possibly
reasonable attorney's fees) to advise the beneficiary of a payment order instructing payment to
the beneficiary's account before midnight of the next funds-transfer business day following the
payment date (the latter being usually the day the order is received by the beneficiary's bank).
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III Suspension of payment by an intermediary bank
In principle, a sender is liable to a receiving bank for the amount of an accepted
payment order. Accordingly, UCC § 4A-402 provides that the acceptance of a
payment order by a receiving bank entitles the accepting bank to receive
payment from the sender.
This rule is compromised under Article 4A in connection with erroneous
payment orders (governed by § 4A-205), payment orders misdescribing the
beneficiary (governed by § 4A-207), as well as erroneous (or nonconforming)
execution (governed by § 4A-303). It is further superseded where the funds
transfer is aborted, namely not completed, due to the suspension of payment
by the intermediary bank (causing the receiving bank not to execute the
payment order received from such an insolvent sender).
Under what came to be known as the "money-back guarantee" rule of
Article 4A,7 ' payment by the sender is excused, or can be refunded to him,
where the funds transfer is not completed. Nonetheless, an originator that
selected a failed intermediary bank is responsible for the amount prepaid by the
sender to that bank. Otherwise, where loss occurred at an intermediary bank,
the effect of the "money-back guarantee" rule is to shift the risk of loss away
from the originator and to place it on the sender to the insolvent bank,
regardless of whether loss was caused by a breach of duty.
No similar "money-back guarantee" exists under the common law. As
indicated, at common law, the liability of the originator's bank to the
originator is not absolute. Rather, it either depends on negligence in choosing
the failed intermediary, or is vicarious, for the negligence of either the failed
intermediary or of its sender in selecting that intermediary.
IV Unauthorized and unintended payment orders
A payment order that reached a receiving bank might not have been sent by the
purported sender or on his behalf. Alternatively, particularly in an electronic
environment, a payment order may be issued by the sender containing different
instructions from those intended. Finally, before its arrival at the receiving
bank, the text of a payment order may be altered in the course of its
transmission through a communication system. While the first case is of an
unauthorized payment order, the two others involve unintended payment
orders.
In principle, a person is responsible for an authorized payment order sent by
himself or on his behalf. Stated otherwise, the starting point is that one is not
responsible for an unauthorized order but is fully responsible for an authorized
one regardless of any mistake or discrepancy in its content. This well
established and fully logical principle is further refined and occasionally defied
by UCC Article 4A.
(i) Unauthorized orders
Under Article 4A, the customer is liable to the receiving bank for the amount
of any authorized payment order for which the customer is bound under the
law of agency. Authority could be express, implied or apparent. (Quaere as to
71 See UCC § 4A-402 Official Comment 2.
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whether estoppel, by negligence or conduct, from denying authority, is
included.) The customer is also liable for the amount of any payment order,
including an unauthorized one, whose authenticity was verified by the bank
pursuant to a commercially reasonable security procedure agreed upon
between the customer and the bank. A security procedure may require the
use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption or
call back procedures (but may not be constituted by a mere comparison
between a signature and an authorized specimen signature). A verified payment
order should not be beyond the scope of any written agreement between the
bank and the customer or instruction of the customer, restricting acceptance of
payment orders issued in the name of the customer. However, an unauthorized
order does not bind the customer notwithstanding its proper verification where
the customer and the bank agreed to allocate the loss, in whole or in part, to
the bank, or where the customer proves that the order was not caused by a
person other than an interloper.
72
The entire scheme can be described as follows: The risk of an unauthorized
payment order falls initially on the bank. Such risk shifts to the customer if the
bank proves its own compliance with an agreed-upon commercially reasonable
security procedure. The risk shifts back to the bank where the loss is proved by
the customer to be caused by an interloper or is allocated to the bank by
agreement.
Having paid for a payment order, however, the customer is precluded from
asserting lack of authority or lack of verification, unless he notifies the bank of
any obection within one year from being advised by the bank of the payment
order.
A receiving bank that paid a payment order for which the customer is not
responsible is liable for interest subject to the customer's duty to notify "within
a reasonable time not exceeding 90 days" after being advised of the transfer. 74
(ii) Unintended payment order
In an electronic environment, typically errors in a payment order include the
transmittal of a duplicate payment order, an increase in the amount of a
payment order (for example, by the addition of zeros to the sum) or the
instruction of payment to an unintended beneficiary (usually by erring in the
account or identification number of the intended beneficiary). Article 4A
provides for the allocation of responsibility for such errors.
In principle, the sender is responsible for the contents of his own payment
72 UCC § 4A-201 to 203. According to § 4A-202(c), commercial reasonableness of a security
procedure is a question of law to be determined by considering the wishes of the customer
expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer known to the bank (including the size,
type and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to the bank), alternative
security procedures offered to the customer and security procedures in general use by customers
and receiving banks similarly situated. A security procedure is deemed to be commercially
reasonable if (i) the security procedure was chosen by the customer after the bank offered and the
customer refused a security procedure that was commercially reasonable for the customer, and
(ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any payment order, whether or not
authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in compliance with the security
procedure chosen by the customer.




order. He is also responsible for a discrepancy arising in the course of the
transmittal of a payment order through a third party communication system
(eg SWIFT). This means that such an intermediary system is deemed to be an
agent of the sender who is bound by the contents of the payment order as sent
to the receiving bank by that communication system.
75
A sender can nevertheless shift the loss arising from the transmittal of an
erroneous payment order (whether by itself or by a communication system
acting as his agent) where the receiving bank has failed to comply with an
agreed-upon security procedure which would have detected the error. Such a
procedure may require a unique code for each payment order (so as to alert the
receiving bank in case of a duplicate payment), different codes for different
levels of amounts or identify regular beneficiaries. 76 In order to benefit the
sender, the security procedure, with which the receiving bank failed to comply,
must have been agreed upon in advance.
Recovery of an erroneous payment resulting from an erroneous payment
order 77 can be made, but only to the extent allowed under the law of mistake
and restitution. 78 Such recovery is available to the erring bank only directly
from the actual beneficiary, irrespective whether the two are in privity. A
sender notified of an erroneous payment order who negligently failed to report
the error "within a reasonable time, not exceeding 90 days" of being advised,
cannot shift the loss to the receiving bank which did not comply with the






78 For this remedy see more in the ensuing discussion on nonconforming execution.
79 UCC § 4A-205(b).
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